In this paper, we propose an improved version of the power index related to the Banzhaf power index for weighted voting systems. This index now takes into account the mutual persuasion power matrix(PPM) existing among the voters. This improved index is calculated for European Union voting by basing the PPM on immigration data among the EU countries. We also provide better approximation bounds for the Monte Carlo approximation method for computing power indices. keywords: rem. 2010 MSC classification: 91A80. 62P20. 97M40. 91B82. 91A40
Introduction
In the year 1963 the supreme court of the United States gave the historical order of one person one vote, several scientists justified the decision using mathematical analysis of the weighted voting system. The power index for weighted voting systems developed by Banzhaf in 1965 , in the article (Banzhaf 1965) , is one of the pioneers in this field. A good introduction of the theory is the original paper by Banzhaf [8] , a relatively modern approach can be found in [15, 16, 32] . Probabilistic models that construct the index as probabilities can be found in [33, 35] . There is also an axiomatic approach that constructs the indices through an axiomatization that shows the uniqueness of such indices when a set of axioms are satisfied. There are numerous approaches to streamline the axiomatization as in [15, 18, 20] . Let p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , . . . , p m be a number of players with weights w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , . . . , w m . A coalition C, subset of the set of players, is called a wining coalition with respect to a preassigned quota q if C ∈ W C − {p i } W * krishnacharya97@gmaill.com † himadrim@goa.bits-pilani.ac.in ‡ jksahoo@goa.bits-pilani.ac.in Let us call (p i , C) a critical pair when p i ∈ C is critical. Let C i be the set of all pairs where p i is critical. The Banzhaf power index for the player p i is denoted by β i (orβ i ).
γ j β i , is known as the normalized Banzhaf index. β i , the absolute Banzhaf index will, however, be our main focus for this article. The index, though coming to life as a refutal of weighted voting systems, sees a lot of applications in real life. The applications are numerous in social science [14, 29] . In Electoral College voting -members of the parliament possess weighted votes in proportion to the number of constituencies they represent. In intergovernmental organization of nations such as the EU the member countries get their voting weights according to a number of parameters such as population etc [19, 25] . In the context of EU it is a great debate among the researchers if the voting power game used to determine the voting weights is fair [25] and often contains warning against such use [19] . In this paper, we will try to explain yet again why the voting power method used in the EU Parliament may not be the right approach to find the voting rights, now from the perspective of the association between the players. It is evident that only the absolute quantity of the weights measured in economic terms, population, area fail to capture the true 'power of a member' since such power should also include the diplomatic prowess of a nation. In the industry, search engines such as Google use page rank algorithms applying techniques of weighted voting games among others. From a purely theoretical point of view the index has generated interests in the line of inverse problems [2] which is to construct the weights of the players from the indices, or relate the indices with convex geometry [9] or mathematical extensions [30] . The Banzhaf index has been a source of great activities recently. The recent study includes an attack on the computational challenges on the NP complete [31] problem. There have been multiple algorithms that tackle the computational difficulties of the index [13, 28] or find theoretical bounds [22] . A good place to look at different approaches to approximating the index is the survey [27] . The Monte Carlo method by the [3, 4] uses Hoeffding's inequality to give a very strong approximation within a large confidence interval. In [17] the authors consider heuristics based on density functions. In [26] the authors employ generating functions. In this paper, we introduce an improved version of the power index that takes into account situations where not only the individual weights of the players are considered but the associations between players as well. To explain the situation let us consider a set of politicians discussing a motion, irrespective of their partisan interests they can vote or abstain according to their personal preferences and equations. One obvious example is the Indian upper house (Rajya Sabha) debates where the members are frequently persuaded to vote based on issues related to the constituency they represent not completely complying with the partisan goals. Thus we can often form a matrix of associations between the players that does not necessarily represent the ideology based political decisions. In other fields such as geopolitics, we often see the actual strength of a nation is not merely the GDP or the might of its military or population but also the amount of influence that it can exert on the other nations by several means of soft power. In this paper, we quantify the soft power of a nation based on the association matrix and the improved power index developed in this model. To be precise let us say the players {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , . . . , p m } are engaged in a voting game. And a i j ∈ R are numbers that quantify strength of the association between the players, this represents the persuasion power of the player p i has over p j . We postulate that the strength of a coalition is not only the sum of the weights of the players but also the amount of total persuasive power that it holds to sway the motion in its favour by converting other players. Thus the definition of a swinger is changed so that the diplomatic loss of a player leaving the coalition is taken into account. In the real life, the matrix A = (a i j ) will almost surely be not symmetric, as the 'associations' are not symmetric. Ideas to restrict coalitions or equivalently the critical pairs can be observed in [9] where the authors restrict the allowed coalitions to those coalitions forming a convex geometry, this is claimed to represent the EU scenario better. In our scenario, we will restrict the critical pairs in a uniform way to get control over the critical pairs. We see a lot of applications in the fields of social sciences and computer science arising out of the improved Banzhaf power index, we list a few such directions at the end of this article.
Mathematical Model and Methodology
In the recent studies of power indices in voting games, We see a systematic study to improve the applicability of the index to the practice of coalition formation (Burgin, 2001) as well as studies to improve the computational aspects of the power indices [7, 8, 27, 34] . It has not come to our notice any attempt to propose a model where a voter's individual relation (association) with another voter influences the outcome of the coalition formation. For an example consider a game with six players a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a 6 wherein a 1 has very strong positive association with the other players, then any coalition containing a 1 will have negative impact on the other coalition effectively reducing the total weight of the opponent coalition and increasing the weight of coalition containing a 1 . Such scenarios are clearly visible in Parliamentary and legislative assembly election, for instance, members of parliament have strong positive associations with other members having similar political motives. An attempt using the classical power indices or current variations of them will not properly predict the actual strength of a coalition in such realistic scenarios.
Mathematical Formulation
Let {p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p m } be a set of players, with weights w 1 , w 2 , · · · , w m respectively. Consider association between p i and p j as a i j ∈ R, with |a i j | ≤ 1 and a ii = 1 for all i. The matrix Φ = (a i j ) is called the association matrix for the players and the goal is to propose a power index β Φ (p i ) which takes the association matrix into account. It is interesting to note that if all off-diagonal elements in Φ are zero i.e a i j = 0, ∀ i j, then calculations for this formulation reduces to a k−quota banzhaf index as studied in [17] 
Single quota voting game
Consider a voting game with association matrix Φ and a quota q > 0. Let S be the set of all possible coalitions. C ⊆ S is called a winning coalition if
Let W q = {C ⊆ S : C is wining} be the set of winning coalition. A tuple
The improved Banzhaf power index for the player p i is defined as:
where
One can extend the definition to multi-weight and multi-quota voting systems in the following manner. We call a vector
In k−dimensional voting game, the weight for player p i and the quota required for winning coalitions are defined as: 
Calculation of the Banzhaf index and its Approximation
Algorithm 1 β Φ,i for a k-quota game with an association matrix Φ of dimension m× m procedure Exact-Banzhaf-Asso(Φ, w, q)
Exact calculation of the Banzhaf index for a general case is NP-complete as shown in [31] , so we need to find an alternative to Algorithm 1. In [4] , the authors have used a Monte Carlo method to approximate the power indices for the players. We extend this idea for multi-quota games with associations. The approximate banzhaf index for player p i ,β Φ,i will be estimated by sampling random coalitions containing player p i , then calculating the proportion of these samples where p i is a critical. We assume that each sample has a probability β Φ,i of being a coalition where player p i is critical, so we can approximate β Φ,i by taking into consideration several such samples. More precisely the estimation procedure is as follows: Let C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n be n randomly sampled coalitions containing player p i . For 1 ≤ k ≤ n, define a Bernoulli random variable
Now, we estimate the index β Φ,i for p i by using the following estimator
Algorithm 2 is used to compute the improved Banzhaf indices. The number of samples required, n, error bounds and convergence analysis is discussed in Section 4.
Algorithm 2β Φ,i for a k−quota game with an association matrix Φ procedure Approx-Banzhaf-Asso(Φ, w, q, n)
3 Some theoretical results
Given a player p i let us define two functions h(p i ) or simply h(i)
Note that in the definitions of h(i), t(i) we will consider the weights of distinct players as distinct w i s even if they are same! With this notation in place we have the following estimates for the Banzhaf index of a player p i .
Proof. The set of coalitions that are subsets of the set of players w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t(w) such that w 1 + w 2 + w 3 + · · · + w t < q ∃ i, w i = w is not at all winning coalitions so any such coalitions containing the player i is not a critical coalition for the player. Similarly in the other side any superset containing the player i, of the set of players with weights w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w h(i) such that w 1 + w 2 + · · · + w h > q, ∀i, w i w is not a critical coalition for the player as the coalition is winning without the player i. Now t being maximum and h being the minimum we have the result.
In the above proposition the greater the variation in the weights of the players better the estimate from the above inequality. In particular if there is a dominating weight or a very large quota or equivalently a very tiny quota the estimate provided by the above becomes close. Other than that it is of theoretical interest as the estimate provided by the above is not practical. It will be interesting to study in detail such estimates. Proof. Note that the first and the second statements follow from the third so we will prove the third statement. Let us define v(C) for a coalition to be 1 if w(C) > q and 0 otherwise and let us define v
With these functions defined it is easy to observe that
where the sums are running over all possible coalitions. In the following proposition we will find a few general bounds for the power indices for a general voting game. Let us define for a set of players with weights W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , . . . w n } and a quota q two numbers m, M in the folllowing way. Let m be the smallest natural number such that m max W < q and M min W − maxW > q where min W, max W denotes the minimum and the maximum weights among W respectively.
Proposition 3.4. With the above notations we have the following inequalities for the indices.
1.
Note that due to the definition of the numbers m, M any subset of the set of players of size less than m cannot be critical for any player since the total weight does not exceed q and similarly any coalition of size more than M cannot be critical since removing even the maximum weight player does not reduce the weight of the coalition below q so the coalitions that are relevant for the indices are of size between m + 1 and min{M, n}. Now out of these coalitions there are 2 n−1 that do not contain the player indexed i thus we get the first inequality. For the next inequality notice if all the players are critical in all possible coalitions we have all indices equal and maximum possible. In this hypothetical situation we have the total number of pairs (p i , C) where p i ∈ C critical is the sum min{M,n} i=m+1 i n i − n2 n−1 so now dividing the number by n and normalizing we get the result. 2 ⌋ and then we sum the index for all i. Remark 3.6. Note that the lemma 3.2 shows that an assumption such as all players are critical for any coalition is not at all realistic as it puts severe condition on the size of the coalition. This also further shows there are much more scope to improve such bounds by scrutinizing the critical coalitions in detail.
Remark 3.7. For a large set of players with a small variation in the weights the above bounds in 3.2 give better result in the simulation done in the next section.
In our calculation we have observed that for the relative Banzhaf index β i the following relation is valid for any voting game. We have not been able to prove the claim yet but we state it as a Conjecture as it is an interesting and a very narrow bound. 
Error Bounds and Convergence Analysis
It is easy to show that the estimator for the Banzhaf index used in 2.2 is an unbiased estimator Lemma 4.1. Let C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n be set of randomly sampled coalitions containing player p i and X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n be the random variables as defined in previous section. Then the estimatorβ Φ,i is an unbiased estimator for β Φ,i .
Proof. The random variable X k is a Bernoulli random variable with probability of success β Φ,i , so the random variable X = n k=1 X k is Binomial with mean nβ Φ,i . The maximum likelihood estimator for the parameter β Φ,i isβ Φ,i = X n . Since E X n = β Φ,i it implies that the estimatorβ Φ,i is an unbiased maximum likelihood estimator.
Confidence intervals
Before trying to calculate, the confidence interval by using different approximation we first state few results which will help to find the confidence bounds. 
, where x (i) is obtained by dropping the i th component
Several generalization and weaker version of self-bounding (one can refer [10, 11] ) are defined by the following definitions. 
x i is selfbounding and (1/n, 0) weakly selfbounding.
Proof. Let us take
1 n x i = f which proves that the function is selfbounding. And
n i=1 x i we get the weakly selfbounding for a = To draw best estimates and bounds for any random variable when the variance information is unknown, Hoeffding's inequality [21] is most preferable to use. interval [a, b] , then the following holds.
Now, we state few basic results in the context of self bounding and weak self bounding which we will use for finding one-sided confidence intervals for the indices.
Lemma 4.9. Let X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n be independent and identically distributed random
and f is weakly (a, 0) self bounding then for all t > 0,
Further, if f has (a, 0) self bounding then
In particular, if f :
Since E(Z) = nβ i and f is (1, 0) self bounding. Then by using Lemma 4.9 we get better estimates as the followings
Based on the above results, we arrive a statement to give a precise bound for the estimator and writing as the following lemma a.
Proof. We are looking an ǫ for which P(|β Φ,i − β Φ,i | < ǫ) is atleast 1 − δ. Since X i 's are bounded by [0, 1], so by using Hoeffding's inequality, the ǫ should satisfy
This proves first part of the lemma. Since X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n are independent and Bernoulli trials with mean µ = β Φ,i and variance σ 2 = β Φ,i (1 − β Φ,i ). So for large n, and using central limit theorem, the random variable
If σ is unknown and n is large, then X − β Φ,i S / √ n is approximately t− distribution with degrees of freedom (n − 1), where S 2 is the sample variance and defined by
Which completes the second part of the theorem.
From the above Lemma, it can be observed that the number samples required to get the accuracy ǫ is at least ln (2/δ) 2ǫ 2 or
ǫ 2 in case of part (b).
Theorem 4.11. Let X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n be n random samples. Then for given accuracy ǫ > 0, the confidence interval for β Φ,i (with confidence level
Proof. By using equation 6,we obtain
Using proposition 3.4, and denoting the bound for 2β i + ǫ as B = B w,q,ǫ , we have the following bound:
Since the random variableβ Φ,i − β Φ,i is approximately normal distribution with mean zero.
This completes the proof. 
Experimental Results
In this section, we will discuss the comparison of 3−quota banzhaf indices without association (WTA) and with the association matrix(WA). In the comparison analysis, the European Union voting system [36] is considered along with the following quota. For our analysis we consider the countries with weights more than equal to 7,i.e, w ≥ 7. The weight-data and population data can be found in 1 2 . The association matrix Φ is taken based on the immigration between the respective EU countries. We define the association matrix in the following manner. Let us denote M i, j be the number of people migrating from country i to country j and M j,i be the number of people migrating from country j to country i. Define M = max i j |M i, j − M j, i|. Now the association matrix Φ i, j defined as
Using the above immigration association matrix, improved Banzhaf indices are computed and given in Table 1 . The approximated Banzhaf indices without association (WTA-Approx) and with random association matrix (WA-Random-Approx) are computed by using Algorithm 2 which discussed in Section 2. Note that while computing the indices, we use a single random matrix and obtain the exact value of WA-Random. and for computing the approximated indices, we run the algorithm 20 times and then averaged. Similar computation followed for WTA-Approx. Also we consider ǫ = 0.01 and δ = 0.01 for each of the approximation algorithm runs. The result displayed in Table 3 justifies that the Banzhaf indicesβ Φ,i are obtained satisfies P(|β Φ,i − β Φ,i | > ǫ) ≤ δ.
Conclusion
We have an improved and generalized power index that captures the internal dynamic of players in real life situations that typically arise as examples of voting games. The few main lines of future research directions that can be picked up from here are that of showing theoretical results regarding the index. Better approximations of the index as in [15] could be also interesting to investigate. In the direction of application one can look into ways of estimating the association matrix data in real life, and the subsequent theoretical analysis of the effect of the association matrix on the index. In the third line we would like mention that with a restricted domain of weights such as weights satisfying some conditions as in [] is a very interesting future direction. A complete development of axiomatics of the improved index as in [12, 16] is also a theoretical problem.
